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- NOTES -
THE RIGHT TO KILL WILD ANIMALS IN DEFENSE OF
PERSON OR PROPERTY
According to the philosophy of natural rights espoused by Locke
and, Montesquieu, every man has certain inalienable rights which are
fundamental to his nature. One of the most important of these inchoate
rights is the right to defend one's person and property.' Does this right
extend to the killing of wild animals in defense of person or property?
. A wild animal for the purposes of the present discussion is defined
as an animal that is protected by state or federal game laws. The
subsequent discussion deals primarily with the killing of wild animals
in defense of one's property. Although there is no case involving the
killing of wild animals in defense of one's person, the right should
exist with the same elements and requirements discussed below in relation
to property. Most statutes contain an exception for wild animals en-
dangering life.2 It seems highly unlikely that an individual protecting
himself will be prosecuted for killing a protected animal. There may be
a problem when this defense is used as a shield by a poacher, but the
burden of establishing the requirements for the utilization of the de-
fense is upon such individual.
BASIS FOR THE RIGHT
The theoretical basis for the right to kill wild animals in defense
of person or property is derived from the corresponding right or
privilege to kill a fellow human being in self-defense or in defense of
property. In the leading case on the subject, State v. Rathbone,3 the
Montana court stated:
If one may kill a human being or attack him in defense of his
property, it would be an unreasonable doctrine to hold that the
right of defense of property as justification for the killing of wild
beasts of the field and forest does not exist.!
The Montana Constitution like most states has an express provision
guaranteeing the right to defend person and property and the use of
'Blackstone states: "Self-defense, therefore, as it is justly called the primary law
of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society."
3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 4.
2For example, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA § 26-135 (1947) (hereinafter referred to
as RCM) states: "Provided further, no ferocious animal damaging property or
endangering life shall be covered by this act.''
'110 Mont. 225, 100 P.2d 86 (1940).
'State v. Rathbone, supra at 91. Accord, State v. Ward, 170 Iowa 185, 152 N.W. 501,
502 (1915).
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arms in such defense. 5 In states where there is no express constitutional
provision relating to the defense of property, the justification of killing
wild animals in defense of property has been held to exist based upon
the guarantee of due process provided by state constitutional provisions.
To force a person to passively allow his land to be destroyed by wild
animals which are protected by legislative actions constitutes a depri-
vation of property without due process. 6 Most legislation extending pro-
tection to wild animals is cognizant of this inchoate right of defense of
property and person when it expressly exempts from its provisions
ferocious animals that endanger life and property.
7
This "self-evident" natural right to kill wild animals in defense
of property may traditionally and historically be considered ". . . implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty' '8 and together with the Fourth
Amendment of the Bill of Rights may even give rise to a federal con-
stitutional right.
AVAILABILITY OF THE RIGHT
Since the right to protect person and property is inherent, it extends
to all persons who can classify as owners of property. By applying
the theoretical basis for the existence of the right, it should extend
to persons who are non-owners of land since there is the analogous
right to kill in defense of another in criminal law." The case law treat-
ing this aspect tends to narrowly restrict the breadth and availability
of this right to non-owners.
In State v. Mohler,10 the defendant landowner and a compatriot
who supplied the hunting dog were convicted of hunting rabbits out
of season. The rabbits were destroying the defendant's apple orchard.
The state statute allowed the killing of protected animals if they were
destroying property. The court reversed the conviction of the defendant,
but affirmed the conviction of his compatriot on the grounds that he
was participating in the hunt. The justification of defense of another's
property apparently was not applicable. 1
5ART. III § 3 of the Montana Constitution provides: "All persons are born equally
free, and have certain natural, essential, and inalienable rights, among which may
be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives, liberties, of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness in lawful ways." ART. III § 12 provides: ''The right of any person to keep
or bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but nothing
herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons.'' See also
RCM 64-210: "Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury
the person or property of one's self, or of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other
relative, or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master or guest."
6State v. Burk, 114 Wash. 370, 195 P. 16, 18 (1921); Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371,
377 (Wyo. 1962).
7For example RCM § 26-135 supra note 2.
'Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
9ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 909 (1957).
1044 Ohio App. 52, 184 N.E. 298 (1932).
hId. at 300.
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In State v. Whitehead,12 deer were damaging crops of the owner.
A friend and next door neighbor killed three deer illegally, apparently
at the request of the owner. A state statute allowed a landowner him-
self to kill deer which are substantially damaging crops, or to authorize
a member of the family or a person employed by him to kill such deer.
The court held that there was no establishment of an employee-employer
relationship, and precluded the defendant from asserting the justifi-
cation.13
There is a statutory basis for the extension of the right to kill
wild animals in defense of person or property to members of one's family,
guests, and those in an employee-employer relationship.
14
The reason for the hesitancy to expand the availability of the right
to non-owners is that it will provide a simple means for over-enthusiastic
hunters and poachers to circumvent the game laws. It must be remembered
that the poacher who interposes such a defense is not automatically
absolved of the charge. He has the heavy burden of proving sufficient
facts and circumstances to justify the defense. It is submitted that the
right to kill wild animals in defense of another's property should be
available as a legal justification.
NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEFENSE
A person seeking to invoke the legal justification of defense of prop-
erty must fulfill the following requirements:
1) he. must have exhausted all other remedies provided by law;
2) the use of such force must be reasonably necessary and suitable
to protect his property; and 3) he must use only such force and
means as a reasonably prudent man would use under like circum-
stances.'
Exhaustion of All Other Legal Remedies
The only legal remedy available in most states to a landowner whose
-property is being destroyed by wild animals is found in the statutory
power granted the fish and game commission to open a special hunting
season, destroy the animals, or grant the landowner a special permit to
kill the animals. 6 Most statutes of this type merely clothe the agency
with a discretionary power to exercise any of the above mentioned methods.
Since a person attempting to obtain relief under this statute cannot
12151 Me. 135, 116 A.2d 618 (1955).
1Id. at 623.
"4RCM § 64-210 supra at note 5.
.
15State v.'Rathbone, supra at 93.
.
6RCM § 26-135 provides that after a compliant has been made: "The department may
then decide to open a special season on said game, or if the special season method
_ be not feasible, then the department may destroy the animals causing the damage.
Provided, further that the fish and game department may authorize and grant the
holders of said property permission to kill or destroy a specified number of the ani-
mals causing the damage." (emphasis provided)
1970]
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compel such agency to exercise its discretion by means of a writ of man-
damus,' 7 all legal remedies are exhausted once the complaint to the local
agency is made and subsequently denied. Since the title to wild animals
is in the state, it is doubtful whether a landowner could enjoin the state
from allowing the animals to run loose. Sovereign immunity precludes
the landowner from bringing suit against the state for damages.' s
Force Reasonably Necessary and Suitable for Protection of Property
The general rule is that the justification cannot be based upon a mere
trespass. There must be substantial damage. 19  The common law sur-
rounded the right to kill a human in defense of property with strict,
rigid, formal, technical rules and distinctions. 20 The first American
decision dealing with the right to kill wild animals in defense of prop-
erty held that these technical rules were not applicable to the killing
of wild animalsY'l In a definitive, rambling analysis of the common
law in typical 19th Century style, the New Hampshire court intimated
that killing of wild animals for a mere trespass might be allowable, and
based this reasoning upon the common law evaluation of animals.
22
This reasoning and rationale sounds valid when the actual value
of wild animals to man is considered. But very early the New York
court recognized that the state has interest in the intellectual and
aesthetic needs of the individual and that in protecting wild animals
for the benefit of the whole populace, certain incidental damages or
injuries must be absorbed by the individual.2 The Montana court has
charged the landowner with notice of the presence of wild animals and
their peculiar habits and that some injury will be suffered for which
there will be no redress.2 4
"
7State v. State Fish and Game Commission, 151 Mont. 45, 438 P.2d 663, 666 (1968);
State v. Rathbone, supra at 95.
'See Barrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917) (owner of wooded building
sites was not able to collect from the state for damages done to trees by protected
beavers) ; Cook v. State, 192 Wash. 602, 74 P.2d 199 (1937) (owners of ice skating
rink were not able to collect from the state for loss of business due to destruction
of rink by beavers).
'
0Barrett v. State, supra at 100; State v. Urban, 60 S.D. 614, 245 N.W. 474, 476
(1932); State v. Mohler, supra at 299; Cook v. State, supra at 202; State v.
Rathbone, supra at 92; State v. State Fish and Game Commission, supra at 667.
2 Defense of property was predicated upon rules such as the difference between prop-
erty in general and property used for habitation. Whether the trespasser was intend.
ing to commit a felony or inflict personal harm upon the dweller or some other
person within the house was important. There was conflict over the retreat and the
no-retreat rule. The doctrine of molliter manus imposuit applied to the defense of
property since the common law valued human life more than property. See PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 913-919.
"Aldrich v. Wright, 53 New Hampshire Reports 398, 403 (1873).
"Human life of inestimable value; domesticated animals, valuable for food or for
practical use, far less worthy than the human species; domesticated vermin less worthy
still; mischievous wild vermin, a public nuisance--such is the common law appraisal
.... the legal inferiority of vermin life in its wild state, to base to be admitted to
the lowest rank of property, is a sufficient reason for holding it reasonably necessary
that an owner of property should prevent a trespass by the prompt destruction of
such life. '' Id. at 418-419.
'Barrett v. State, supra at 100.
24State v. Rathbone, supra at 92.
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What kind and how much damage is necessary in order to constitute
substantial damage is a question of fact that depends on the circum-
stances of each case. The mere eating of a few tufts of grass in a swampy
area by elk does not constitute substantial damage .25 But continual
destruction and eating of crops or feed by deer or elk curtailing pro-
duction of hay, trampling valuable grazing land, and interfering with
normal ranching operations provides more than substantial damage. 26
It is generally held that there must be an imminent danger or de-
struction by the animal, or it must be in the act of actual destruction
before the right can be invoked.27 The past history and migratory
habits of wild animals in relation to past damages is relevant in order
to show the animal's future destructive capability. 2s One court has im-
posed a further qualification upon the admission of such evidence with
the requirement that the animal killed must be identified as being a
member of the herd that caused the previous damage. 29 Similarly, where
the animal is not in the act of actual destruction of property when it
is killed, the requirements for the availability of the defense are not
met.
3 0
Before the owner can exercise his right to kill wild animals in
defense of property, other reasonable alternatives must be utilized.3 1
When the erection of elk and deer-proof fences, constant vigilance and
the driving off of the animals exceeds the standard of reasonableness in
terms of prohibitive costs, time and practicality, the right to kill is
justified.32
Force and Means that a Reasonably Prudent Man Would Use
This third element for the justification of killing wild animals
basically involves the application of a reasonable man standard. The
determination of whether the force and means employed measures up to
the standard of a reasonable man is a question for the jury.33 As stated
above, this is basically a question of proving to the jury that there was
sufficient damage to justify the killing of the wild animal in defense of
property.
'State v. State Fish and Game Commission, supra at 667.
"State v. Rathbone, supra; Cross v. State, supra.
'Aldrich v. Wright, supra at 403.
2State v. Rathbone, supra at 95; State v. Burk, supra at 19.
'State v. Burk, supra at 19.
'State v. Urban, supra at 476; State v. Burk, supra at 19; State v. Whitehead, supra at
623.
"See Aldrich v. Wright, supra; State v. Rathbone, supra.
"See State v. Rathbone, supra (impractical to build fence due to size of ranch, almost
impossible to build an elk proof fence, driving off of elk is ineffective due to their
nocturnal feeding habits) ; Cross v. State, supra (use of cherry bombs as driving
off device ineffective as well as airplane); Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 5 Pa. D. & C.
443 (1924) (exorbitant cost of building fence to keep out deer constituted an 'unjust
discrimination and one that the law would not sanction"I).
"Cotton v. State, 31 Ala. App. 399, 17 So.2d 590, 591 (1944) ; State v. Rathbone, supra
at 95.
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CONCLUSION
The right to kill wild animals in defense of person and property
is available wherever it is reasonably necessary to do so in order to
protect such person or property. In relation to defense of property,
the right is available only to landowners or where provided by statute
to members of the family or employees. What facts and circumstances
justify the exercise of the right depend upon each individual case and
is for the jury to determine. With the present age of environmentalists
and conservationists this right to destroy wild animals may be challenged
and examined. Notwithstanding this consideration, the right to kill
wild animals in defense of person and property should be maintained
since it plays a vital part in the right to maintain and own private
property and the utilization of the right to kill wild animals is an
extraordinary and abnormal event.
RON A. BENDER
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